The writer visited Kyiv, Lviv, and Chernovtsy before
crossing into Moldova. After leaving Moldova, the writer went to
Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhya, and Kharkiv, all in Ukraine.
A second visit to Kyiv occurred at the end of the trip.
Ukraine is the second largest new state to have
emerged from the former Soviet Union, following only Russia in size.
It is approximately equal to France in both territorial expanse
and population. Reflecting economic chaos and emigration, the number
of its inhabitants has diminished from over 52 million at independence
in 1991 to about 50 million in 1998. About 90,000 more people died
in the first three months of 1998 than were born during the same
period, a trend that has been visible for several years.1
The gross domestic product of Ukraine has decreased
by about 60 percent since 1991 and only recently has begun to show
a marginal increase. Commentary on the Ukrainian economic situation
in both the international and Ukrainian press has been extensive,
pointing to the following factors as critical: excessive government
spending; failure to develop and enforce an equitable tax system;
massive foreign borrowing; lack of reform in agricultural and energy
sectors; widespread corruption; and rampant crime. Such conditions
drive off foreign investment, which has diminished substantially
in the last several years. About one-half of the economy is in private
hands.
The absence of a tax system has led to a near-collapse
of the public sector. Wage and pension arrears reached approximately
$5 billion in mid-1998. The physical infrastructure of the country
is crumbling, public education has deteriorated, and the quality
of medical care is declining.
In national elections for the Ukrainian Rada (parliament)
in March 1998, Communists won the largest bloc of seats (25 percent)
on a platform of reversing the major portion of privatization, a
partial re-nationalization of the banking and industrial sectors,
and "voluntary reunification" with Russia. Other leftist
parties gained another 15 to 20 percent of Rada seats. Business
interests attained 40 to 50 percent of Rada positions. The resulting
composition of the Rada is likely to obstruct the reform efforts
of President Leonid Kuchma. Presidential elections will be held
in October 1999.
"Ukrainianization" continues at a rapid
pace. Russian remains the working language of almost all large cities,
but street and commercial signs are shifting to Ukrainian.2
Television is highly politicized, newspapers somewhat less so.
Independent Ukraine is not without positive aspects.
The recent elections were considered clean by independent observers.
Ethnic demagoguery is much less visible than Ukrainian history might
suggest. Antisemitism persists, but its base is almost entirely
at a popular, street level without government support. Ukraine enjoys
good relations with its neighbors, although Russia persists in its
irritation over Ukrainian control of Crimea, a strategic area with
an overwhelmingly Russian population. Ukraine declared itself a
non-nuclear weapons state in 1994, accepting international assistance
in removing Soviet nuclear arms from its territory. Under United
States pressure, Ukraine ceased nuclear cooperation with Iran in
1997.
Ukraine is the fourth largest recipient of U.S.
foreign aid, beneficiary of $225 million in 1998. English-language
skills are highly valued. |

1. Rabbi Yaakov
Dov Bleich, a Karliner-Stoliner hasid and Chief Rabbi of
Kyiv and Ukraine, returned to Kyiv with his family in mid-winter
after a prolonged absence due to illness. Rabbi Bleich is considered
one of the more effective rabbis in the transition states, a skilled
analyst and capable organizer. He has resumed a vigorous schedule,
continuing to build various local and national Jewish institutions.
Although he would have initiated such endeavors under any circumstances,
the strengthening of alternative Jewish organizations assumed a
new urgency following the establishment of the All-Ukraine
Jewish Congress (Всеукраїнський
Еврейський
Конгресс)
by Vadim Rabinovich in April
1997.
Vadim Rabinovich is on the "watch list"
of the United States, denied entry to the U.S. and shunned by senior
American officials because of his involvement in narcotics trafficking,
weapons trading, money laundering, and other criminal activity.
His pretension to Jewish communal leadership is, at minimum, a serious
distraction to the tasks of Jewish governance and Jewish community-building
in Ukraine. Mr. Rabinovich is a financial supporter of Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma, who, in turn encourages Mr. Rabinovich
in his Jewish communal endeavors. Mr. Kuchma is said to believe
that an active organized Ukrainian Jewish infrastructure may be
able to engage the support of the American Jewish lobby, which Mr.
Kuchma perceives as influential in shaping U.S. foreign policy.
Despite entreaties by the U.S. government, Mr. Kuchma persists in
his support of Mr. Rabinovich as a Jewish communal leader.
Rabbi Bleich has embarked upon a two-tiered strategy
to cope with Mr. Rabinovich. First, he is working to strengthen
local and national Jewish institutions (such as the Kyiv Municipal
Jewish Association, an umbrella organization for various local Jewish
groups, and the Union of Jewish Religious Organizations of Ukraine)
that provide an alternative source of services to Ukrainian Jews.
Second, he has accepted a modest role inside the Congress that permits
him to monitor and exert some influence over Congress activity.
The scope of All-Ukraine
Jewish Congress operations has been circumscribed by the
refusal of Chabad rabbis within Ukraine to affiliate with it. Thus,
Mr. Rabinovich is denied the support of leading Jewish organizations
in such large cities as Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, as well as a
host of smaller Ukrainian Jewish communities in which the Chabad
movement predominates. However, more than 100 local Jewish groups
have associated with the Congress, most in hope of receiving financial
stipends from it. Financial grants to member organizations has been
minimal. Mr. Rabinovich's dictatorial and mercurial leadership style
further limits his effectiveness.
2. The Kyiv Municipal
Jewish Association brings together 18 local Jewish organizations
under the leadership of Rabbi Yaakov Bleich and Executive Director
Anatoliy P. Shengait. These
organizations include: Club for Intelligentsia, a Home for Elderly
(under development; see below), the Jewish Musical Theater Neshoma
(group of elderly singers), Hesed Avot, Chevra Kadisha, Jewish Women's
Club, Shadchan Service, the Center for Vocational Retraining, the
Jewish Press and Information Center, the monthly Jewish newspaper
Vozrozhdeniye (Возрождение;
Renaissance), a klezmer ensemble, the nascent Jewish University
group Ekonomika (see below),
Makor (youth initiatives), Gymnasium #299 (day school under Rabbi
Bleich's supervision), the Children's Musical Theater Emuna,
Jewish summer camps, and a Jewish sports club.
Rabbi Bleich has secured funding from about 20
local Jewish donors for support of these organizations and for general
communal activity. For example, the Association held a farewell
party for Zvi Magen, the
former Ambassador of the State of Israel, shortly before he departed
from Ukraine. Chabad and Progressive groups have not joined this
institution. |

1. Kyiv
Post, 4:36 (May 8, 1998), p. 3. The birth rate among the
Ukrainian Jewish population, in particular, is even lower. Ukrainian
Jewish deaths are believed to exceed Ukrainian Jewish births by
about 9:1.
2. Most
native speakers of Russian are able to understand 70 to 80 percent
of written Ukrainian.
|