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This report reviews a visit by the writer to eastern Ukraine from
May 20 to June 1, 2003. The cities visited include three of the
five largest in Ukraine -- Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk.1
Other cities visited were Zaporizhya and Krivyy Rig in the same
region.2
Collectively, more than 100,000 Jews live in this
area, a number larger than that of the Jewish population living
in Kyiv and the region surrounding the Ukrainian capital. Although
estimates of the size of the Jewish populations in these and other
Ukrainian cities vary, many observers believe that the Jewish
population of Dnipropetrovsk is between 30,000 and 35,000, second
in Ukraine only to that of Kyiv (perhaps 70,000 to 80,000). The
Jewish population of Kharkiv may number 25,000 to 30,000, and that
of Donetsk may be 14,000. The Jewish populations of Zaporizhya
and Krivyy Rig probably are between 7,000 and 8,000 each.
The general population
of Ukraine continues to decline, from approximately 53 million at
the time of independence in 1991 to 47.8 million in mid-2003. Causes
of population loss are aging of the population, low fertility, high
mortality, significant substance abuse (alcohol, narcotics, tobacco),
poor nutrition, inadequate medical care, impoverishment, and environmental
degradation. Fully one percent of the Ukrainian population is believed
to be HIV-positive. Life expectancy of men and women is 62 and 73
years of age respectively.
The Jewish population
in Ukraine is declining even more precipitously than the general
population. The “core” Jewish population, i.e., the
number of individuals who declare themselves as Jews to census takers,
is reported by both the Ukrainian government and academic specialists
at Hebrew University in Jerusalem to be slightly more than 100,000.
The “extended” Jewish population, i.e., core Jews as
well as Jews who do not identify as Jews to census takers and non-Jews
related to Jews, is believed to be between 200,000 and 300,000.3
All such individuals are eligible to immigrate to Israel under provisions
of the Israeli Law of Return.
Economic conditions
in Ukraine are complex and appear to be deteriorating. The gross
domestic product of Ukraine was growing at an annual rate of between
five and six percent at the time of the writer’s visit. However,
observers estimated that the middle and upper classes together constitute
only about ten percent of the entire Ukrainian population. According
to Ukrainian government statistics, about 50 percent of the population
lives below the poverty line, a cohort including most elderly people
and many children. The average salary is about $52 monthly, and
the average household income is about $70 monthly. Real unemployment
in many large urban areas may be as high as 40 percent, and fully
75 percent of the population derives a major portion of its income
from a “second” or “grey” economy. The dominance
of the grey economy extracts a major toll on rural and elderly populations,
neither of whom have opportunities to engage in secondary economy
activity. A growth in inflation places a further burden on pensioners
and others dependent on fixed incomes.
The combination of an unusually harsh winter, a
hot and dry spring, and an invasion of locusts in spring of 2003
has created expectations of a 2003 grain harvest 40 percent lower
than that of 2004. One press account described “frantic consumer
hoarding [in late June] of flour, sugar and other basic foods amid
fears of shortages in Ukraine.”4 Consumers across Ukraine were
further reported to be “snapping up flour, buckwheat, sugar
and pasta – sometimes intercepting it as it is unloaded from
trucks . . .”. Retail prices for flour were reported to have
doubled and prices for other basic staples to have risen “dramatically”
in late June. The Ukrainian government promised to release grain
from state reserves and to purchase food abroad in an effort to
stabilize prices. |
Politically,
Ukraine is tense as politicians and commentators look to 2004 when
President Leonid Kuchma
is required by law to step down after completing two five-year terms
in power. Speculation is rife that he will try to find some way
of extending his authority. Should retention of office be impossible,
Mr. Kuchma and his associates are actively engaged in preventing
reformist candidates from winning the presidential election. President
Kuchma and the business elite enjoy substantial, even overwhelming,
financial and media resources as well as support from Russia, which
is apprehensive of any Ukrainian nationalism and unpredictability
that might emerge in a major change of government.
Freedom House, the respected American oversight
organization, lowered Ukraine’s status in 2003 from “Partly
Free” to “Not Free.” Its report stated:
Freedom of the press [in Ukraine] declined under
the continued weight of political pressure and government censorship.
Article 34 of the constitution, and a 1991 law on print media,
guarantee freedom of expression and the press, but journalists
do not enjoy these rights in practice. Official influence and
de facto censorship are widespread. The Administration issues
regular instructions . . . to mass media outlets directing the
nature, theme, and substance of news reporting.5
Most observers believe that Mr. Kuchma will fail
in attempts to extend his term of office, but predict an ugly contest
for succession. Opposition parties in Ukraine have few legal rights
and are poorly organized. The usually coarse political scene is
further complicated by conflicts and competition between rival business/media
clans based in different cities, particularly in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk,
and Donetsk.
Jewish community activity
continues to expand, especially in areas under rabbinic or Jewish
Agency for Israel (Sochnut) purview. Two of the most significant
developments in mid-2003 have been the opening of the newly renovated
Choral Synagogue in Kharkiv6
and the transfer of responsibility for formal Jewish education from
the government of Israel to the Jewish Agency for Israel.
The government of Israel established secular Jewish/Zionist
day schools in Jewish population centers in the post-Soviet
states during the early 1990’s, intending that such institutions
build Jewish identity and encourage aliyah of children and their
families to Israel. After an initial period of confrontation with
day schools opened by the growing number of Orthodox (principally
Hasidic) rabbis in many of the same cities, the Israeli
government Tsofia system embraced many of the rabbinic-sponsored
schools as well. The program was operated jointly by Nativ7
and the Israeli Ministry of Education. By the late 1990’s,
it provided assistance to 44 Jewish day schools and 180 Jewish Sunday
schools, enrolling approximately 11,000 and 10,000 pupils respectively.
The major form of assistance was compensation for 91 Israeli Hebrew-language
and Jewish studies teachers and provision of some teaching materials
for the day schools. Some aid also was provided to Sunday schools,
whose teachers are local residents. Budgetary pressures limited
expansion of the program, rendering it unable to extend assistance
to newer day schools later in the decade and in 2000-2003; by 2003,
56 new Jewish day schools had opened their doors in the post-Soviet
states that is, a larger number than the established schools receiving
Israeli assistance. In 2003, the Ministry of Education announced
that it was unable to continue full funding for its existing post-Soviet
program, now called Hephzibah,
and asked the Jewish Agency Department
of Jewish Zionist Education to join in its management and
support. The Jewish Agency agreed, eager to expand its existing
post-Soviet education portfolio, which included informal education
and some work with preschools and post-secondary institutions. Although
the Ministry of Education will continue to compensate teachers,
the Jewish Agency will absorb management responsibilities, including
selection and training of teachers and other educators, curriculum
development, development of educational materials, programs and
operations, and other tasks.
Individuals in eastern Ukraine with whom the writer
spoke were enthusiastic about transfer of the formal education portfolio
to the Jewish Agency, perceiving it better qualified to work with
diaspora Jewish populations than the Ministry of Education, whose
primary responsibilities are within the State of Israel. Many people,
particularly those associated with newer schools currently not receiving
assistance through the Hephzibah program, also were hopeful that
Jewish Agency participation in Hephzibah would lead to an infusion
of additional funds, some of which could be used to support Hebrew-language
and Jewish studies programs in these schools.8 Individuals with a
broad communitywide view of Jewish life in Ukraine also see benefits
of consolidating most Jewish education efforts under one system,
generating synergies among various programs and multiple use of
existing (and new) education facilities.9 |

1. The
capital city of Kyiv has the largest general population, estimated
at 2.6 million. Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk rank second,
third, and fourth with populations estimated at 1.5 million, 1.1
million, and 1.0 million respectively. Odesa, which the writer did
not visit on this journey, also has a population of about one million.
The general populations of Zaporizhya and Kriviy Rig are estimated
at 875,000 and 715,000 respectively.
2. The
writer also visited Kyiv for one day on June 2. Meetings held in
that city are not recorded in this report.
3. The
estimate of 100,000+ Ukrainian Jews shows a steep decline from the
last Soviet census in 1989, which listed a Ukrainian Jewish population
of 487,000. The reasons for the decline are well-known: an aging
Jewish population (average age close to 60), high mortality rate,
low fertility rate, high assimilation, and massive emigration. The
current intermarriage rate is believed to be about 90 percent in
Kyiv and many other larger Jewish population centers, and the emigration
rate over the last 12 years is estimated by some as 560,000, a number
that includes members of the extended Jewish population as well
as core
4. Associated
Press, June 30, 2003, as reported in Kyiv
Post Daily, July 1, 2003 [online]. See also
Chicago Tribune, June 27, 2003.
5. Thomas
Dine, “Free Press in Russia and Ukraine: A Key to Integration
in Europe,” in Freedom of
the Press 2003 (New York: Freedom House, 2003), p. 150. The
report cited the following as characteristic of Ukrainian media:
state censorship of television broadcasts, harassment and disruption
of independent media, and failure of authorities to investigate
attacks against journalists. Kyiv
Post Daily, June 12, 2003, reported the stabbing of a journalist
on June 11 in Dnipropetrovsk, a key Ukrainian political center and
stronghold of Kuchma support.
6. See
pp. 38-41.
7. Originally
known as Lishkat Hakesher (Liaison
Bureau) or Lishka, this entity
was created in 1952 to coordinate and manage Israel government operations
in the then-Soviet Union. It is attached to the Office of the Prime
Minister, bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
8. It
is unlikely that such funding will become available through the
Jewish Agency in the near future. Continued exclusion of newer day
schools from Israeli funding may constitute a major community relations
problem for the Jewish Agency.
9. Among
the many issues facing the emerging Jewish community in the post-Soviet
states is a serious lack of communal property in which to hold programs.
Jewish day schools under Nativ/Hephzibah auspices generally stood
empty during weekends and holiday periods, inaccessible to other
community organizations seeking space for programs.
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